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TONES THAT ECHO FROM A PAST ERA OF
RIGID JURISPRUDENCE: PRE-CHALLENGE
ROYALTIES AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
SHELL TEST
Andrew C. Michaelst
In the 1969 decision Lear v. Adkins, the Supreme Court held that
patent licensees were no longer estopped from challenging the validity
of licensed patents, citing the 'federal patent policy" of incentivizing
prompt adjudication of the validity of patents. In the 1997 Shell
decision, where the licensed patent was found invalid, the Federal
Circuit nevertheless held that a licensee was not relieved of royalty
obligations that had accrued prior to the licensee's validity challenge.
The decision as a whole applied Lear in view of its underlying policies
and reached the correct result. However the end of the decision sets
forth a one-sentence test which, when applied rigidly, can lead to
results contrary to the policies and equitable considerations underlying
both the Lear and Shell decisions. Some district courts have applied
Shell's test rigidly, whereas others have taken a more holistic and
flexible approach. This article argues that the holistic and flexible
approach to Shell is the correct one, comporting better with both
Shell's developmental roots, and the Supreme Court's current tendency
to repudiate rigidity in Federal Circuit jurisprudence. Besides the
factors captured in Shell's one-sentence test, an examination of the
Shell opinion and the doctrine as a whole reveals that courts should
also consider the structure of the license agreement at issue, as well as
the nature of the invalidating prior art, in deciding whether and when
a licensee should be relieved of royalty obligations accrued under an
invalid patent.
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INTRODUCTION
Where a licensed patent turns out to be invalid, under what
circumstances must a licensee pay royalties accrued under the invalid
licensed patent? Although it is a fundamental axiom of patent law that
one cannot infringe an invalid patent,' courts have nevertheless
required that royalties be paid on invalid patents in certain
circumstances. 2
1. See, e.g., Lazare Kaplan Int'l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 714 F.3d 1289, 1295
(Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[N]o accused products can be found liable for infringement of an invalid claim")
(citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("An
invalid claim cannot give rise to liability for infringement .... )).
2. See, e.g., Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Park City Entm't, Inc., No. 1: 10-cv-195-RJS, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112045 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2013); Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir 1983); PPG Indus.,
Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700 (6th Cir 1976).
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In the landmark 1969 decision Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the Supreme
Court held that generally, where a licensed patent is invalid, a licensee
is relieved of royalty obligations, as patent licensees were no longer
estopped from challenging the validity of licensed patents.' The Court
reasoned that "[1]icensees may often be the only individuals with
enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an
inventor's discovery," and if "they are muzzled, the public may
continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without
need or justification." The Lear Court thus stated that "Lear must be
permitted to avoid the payment of all royalties accruing after Adkins'
1960 patent issued if Lear can prove patent invalidity."'
However, in its 1997 Shell Oil decision, the Federal Circuit
applied an exception to the Supreme Court's general rule against
royalties on invalid licensed patents, stating: "a licensee, such as Shell,
cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i) actually
ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor that
the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is because it has deemed
the relevant claims to be invalid."6 That is, although licensees are not
estopped from challenging validity, and a successful validity challenge
can prospectively relieve the licensee of royalty obligations, a finding
of invalidity generally cannot relieve a licensee of royalties already
paid, or royalties accrued prior to the challenge. Variations of this so-
called "challenge rule"' developed in other circuit courts prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit.'
These circuit courts aptly reasoned that because Lear was based
in part on the "strong federal policy of prompting early adjudication of
patent validity,"' a licensee should not be relieved of royalties until it
"takes an affirmative step that would prompt the early adjudication of
3. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
4. Id at 670.
5. Id. at 674; see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979) ("In
Lear,. .. we held that a licensee who establishes that the patent is invalid need not pay the royalties
accrued under the licensing agreement subsequent to the issuance of the patent.").
6. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
7. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.02[3][b][iv][B] (Matthew Bender).
8. See Shell, 112 F.3d at 1568 (citing, inter alia, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem.,
Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 706, 708 (6th Cir. 1976)); Am. Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp., 614 F.2d 890,
897-98 (3d Cir. 1980)).
9. Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1277, 1283 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982).
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the validity of the patent. . . ."'o If licensees could later be relieved of
royalties accrued or paid before a validity challenge, licensees could be
subject to a "temptation to forestall validity litigation," so as to enjoy
the benefits of a license for as long as possible before later challenging
the validity of a licensed patent, thereby frustrating a federal patent
policy underlying Lear. " For example, in Shell, the licensee (Shell) did
not inform the licensor of all of its licensed polypropylene production,
enjoying the protection of the license until such production was later
discovered by the licensor.12 Once discovered, Shell successfully
challenged the validity of the licensed patent." Excusing Shell from all
unpaid pre-challenge royalties would have created an incentive for
licensees to engage in such dilatory behavior, turning Lear's policy of
incentivizing prompt validity challenge on its head. In developing the
challenge rule, circuit courts thus recognized that Lear's general
statements suggesting that a finding of invalidity relieves a licensee of
all royalty obligationsl4 must be read in context, for it "is a maxim, not
to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be
taken in connection with the case in which these expressions are
used.""
Given this history out of which Shell's test developed, it would be
incongruous to apply the test rigidly without regard to the federal patent
policies and reasoning underlying the Lear and Shell decisions as a
whole. Indeed the importance of the "factual setting" and its bearing on
"federal patent policy" are consistently emphasized throughout the
Shell decision itself.' 6 Yet when confronted with Shell's test, some
10. Id. at 1283; see also PPG, 530 F.2d at 706 ("Something more than mere nonpayment
is required to 'encourage an early adjudication of invalidity."' (quoting Troxel Mfg. Co. v.
Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253,1257 (6th Cir. 1972))).
11. See, e.g., Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 1983); Pony Pal,
LLC v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 2355 (CSH), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14962, at *8-
9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006) ("The Federal Circuit's rationale in Shell Oil was that a licensee who
fails to challenge the validity of a patent benefits by retaining the protection of the license while
depriving the public of the full and free use of the patented product by withholding a successful
challenge to validity. Accordingly, such a licensee should not be allowed to avoid liability for
royalties for any such time period on grounds of patent invalidity.").
12. Shell, 112 F.3d at 1563.
13. Id. at 1568.
14. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) ("Lear must be permitted to
avoid the payment of all royalties accruing after Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove
patent invalidity.").
15. Troxel, 465 F.2d at 1259 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 398
(1821)) (applying this maxim to Lear's general expressions).
16. Shell, 112 F.3d at 1568 ("In this factual setting, therefore, enforcement of the license
according to its terms, even if this entails a determination of whether the Seadrift process infringes
a now-invalidated patent, does not frustratefederal patent policy." (emphases added)).
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courts appear to feel compelled to apply it rigidly,' 7 while others take a
more holistic and flexible approach." This uncertainty in the law was
on display in a recent case where the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California was unsure of whether and how Shell's test should
apply under certain factual circumstances, and certified an
interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit, but the Federal Circuit
declined interlocutory review."
Although Shell was decided correctly on its facts in this author's
view, in part for the reasons captured in Shell's test, the one-sentence
test is not perfect. Factual situations can arise in which rigid application
of Shell's test would lead to a result directly contrary to the federal
patent policies underlying both the Lear and Shell decisions. For
example, although Shell involved a license to one specific patent,
consider a running royalty license to an entire portfolio consisting of
many patents, where there is some uncertainty as to which patents are
implicated by the licensee's products. In such a situation, if the licensor
were to delay in making known its view that the licensee should be
paying royalties on certain products, that could result in a delay to the
licensee's validity challenge. That is, a licensee might not believe it has
any reason to challenge the validity of a patent in the vast licensed
portfolio until the licensor makes known its belief that such patent
requires the payment of additional royalties by the licensee. Strict
application of Shell's test in such a situation would mean that the
licensee must pay pre-challenge royalties even where the patent is
ultimately found invalid, thus creating an incentive for the licensor to
delay validity challenge by delaying in making known its view as to
the import of a potentially invalid patent, precisely the opposite
incentive of what Lear and Shell sought to achieve. Indeed, the Lear
17. See, e.g., Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Park City Entm't, Inc., No. 1 :10-cv-195-RJS,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112045, at * 17 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2013) (stating that Shell does not "suggest
any authority for a trial court to relieve licensees of the prerequisites identified" in the case); see
also discussion infra Part Ill[A].
18. See Medhnmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1016-17 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (explaining that Shell's test, "taken out of context extends the holding far beyond the rest
of the case[,]" and finding that Shell did not "[p]rohibit Medimmune's [i]nvocation of Lear
[b]ecause [i]t [d]ealt [w]ith a [s]ignificantly [d]ifferent [flactual [s]cenario"); see also discussion
infra Part IIl[B].
19. See Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Without
taking any position on the merits of the issues presented, we conclude that the limited
circumstances under which an interlocutory appeal might be permitted are not met in this case.");
see also discussion infra Part lI[C].
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Court explicitly expressed an intent to discourage licensors from
engaging in such dilatory tactics.2 0
Additionally, although Shell involved a patent that was invalid
based on the licensor's own prior work, '21 if the patent is found invalid
based on the licensee's own prior work, it may not make sense to
require the licensee to pay for the use of its own prior work, as such a
result would run contrary to significant federal patent policy concerns
protecting prior users. As will be explained infra, factors relating to
inventorship appear to have been significant in both Lear and Shell, as
well as in other Federal Circuit cases applying Shell. Yet these
important equitable and policy concerns are also not captured in Shell's
one-sentence test.
Perhaps part of the reason that the Federal Circuit in Shell
formulated a set of seemingly rigid prerequisites for a licensee to
"invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine" is that it viewed the
Supreme Court in Lear as having spoken in "tones that echo from a
past era of skepticism over intellectual property principles."22 In the
current climate, however, as evidenced for example by a plethora of
recent Supreme Court decisions against patentees,23 as well as abundant
20. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969) ("Enforcing this contractual provision
would give the licensor an additional economic incentive to device every conceivable dilatory
tactic in an effort to postpone the day of final judicial reckoning.").
21. See Shell, 112 F.3d at 1562-63 (discussing Karl Zeigler, inventor of the licensed patents
in Shell, Nobel laureate, and past director of the Max Plank Institute, of which the licensor in
Shell, SGK, was the licensing arm); U.S. Pat. No. 3,082,197 col. 1 11. 17-18 (filed Dec. 1, 1958)
(describing the subject matter of the invalidating foreign patent in Shell, Belg. Patent No. 538,782
(issued June 8, 1954), and showing that this patent was co-invented by Ziegler.").
22. Shell, 112 F.3d at 1567; see also CHISUM, supra note 7, § 19.02[3] ("Decisions of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have displayed a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for
extending the Lear doctrine."); Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V. O'Shaughnessy, One Year After
MedImmune-The Impact on Patent Licensing & Negotiation, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 403 (2008)
("It is worth noting that the court's fundamental unease with Lear is manifest throughout Shell.");
MedImmune, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 ("Perhaps these Federal Circuit cases reflect the sentiment,
expressed in the 1997 [ShellJ decision, that Lear reflects 'tones that echo from a past era of
skepticism over intellectual property principles."' (quoting Shell, 112 F.3d at 1567)); Minute
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No.
EDCV 05-426-VAP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014) ("Since Lear, however, the Federal Circuit has
expressed doubt about its continuing viability, commenting that the holding in Lear embodies
'tones that echo from a past era of skepticism over intellectual property principles."' (quoting
Shell, 112 F.3d at 1567)).
23. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014)
(unanimously reversing the Federal Circuit, and holding that the patentee bears the burden of
proving infringement when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment of non-infringement);
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (unanimously reversing
the Federal Circuit, and holding that a defendant may not be liable for inducing infringement when
no one has directly infringed the patent); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2120, 2124 (2014) (unanimously holding that the Federal Circuit's standard for patent
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commentary criticizing the patent system,24 one would be hard pressed
to argue that skepticism over intellectual property (particularly patents)
has been entirely relegated to a past era. But ironically, the Federal
Circuit in Shell, with its apparently rigid one-sentence test, may have
itself spoken in tones that echo from a past (or passing) era of rigid
Federal Circuit jurisprudence, as the Supreme Court has since
repeatedly admonished the Federal Circuit for creating such formulaic
tests.25
This article argues that in accordance with this trend in Supreme
Court guidance, as well as the roots of the challenge rule, Shell's test is
best read as two useful clues or guideposts bearing on the question of
whether and when a licensee should be relieved of royalties on an
invalid patent. The Shell decision is generally well-reasoned and is
valuable precedent, but the decision should be read and applied as a
whole, in consideration of its "factual setting," and the underlying
policies that it sought to further. The one-sentence test at the end of the
Shell opinion should not be read out of context as a rigid set of Federal
Circuit created prerequisites that must invariably be met in order for a
licensee to "invoke the protection of' the Supreme Court's Lear
decision. Instead of robotically applying Shell's test, courts should
examine the specific circumstances of each case and consider which
result would best effectuate the policies underlying Lear and Shell.
Besides the factors mentioned in Shell's test, the structure of the license
indefiniteness "tolerates some ambiguous claims but not others, [and] does not satisfy the statute's
definiteness requirement"); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (unanimously
holding that the patent claims at issue are drawn to an abstract idea and are therefore patent
ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
24. See generally, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 BROOK.
L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2013) ("From Silicon Valley engineers, to economists, to legal scholars, and
now to judges, the patent system is thought to be 'in crisis,' 'broken,' a 'failure,' 'an unnecessary
evil,' and 'dysfunctional."' (citations omitted)).
25. See, e.g., Octane Fitness LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755
(2014) ("[T]he framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture is unduly
rigid."); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (holding that while the "machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool," it "is not the sole test");
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's
"reasonable apprehension of suit" test for declaratory judgment case or controversy in favor of a
more flexible "all the circumstances" test); KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007)
("We begin by rejecting the rigid approach [to nonobviousness] of the [Federal Circuit] Court of
Appeals."); see also, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2010)
("Starting about a decade and a half ago, the Supreme Court has more aggressively asserted its
appellate jurisdiction over the Federal Circuit ... . systematically favoring 'holistic' standards
over formulistic rules in a variety of areas of patent doctrine."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What
the Federal Circuit Can Learn fom the Supreme Court-And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787,
805 (2010) (suggesting that well-articulated policy "is a tool that might replace at least some of
the Federal Circuit's famous rigidity").
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agreement (how many patents are involved and any duties of
notification), and the nature of the invalidating prior art (whether it
originates from the licensor or the licensee, or perhaps whether it is an
expired patent), should also be considered.
Part I of this article describes how the Shell test developed out of
cases holistically applying Lear in accordance with Lear's underlying
reasoning and federal patent policies. Part II discusses the Supreme
Court's tendency to repudiate rigidity in Federal Circuit jurisprudence,
a trend that spans at least from shortly after Shell was decided through
the present day. Part III surveys application of the Shell test at the
Federal Circuit and in district courts, illustrating that while some courts
have taken a rigid and literal approach to Shell's test, others have taken
a more holistic and flexible one. Part IV explores scenarios where rigid
application of Shell's test might lead to a result contrary to the policies
underlying the Lear/Shell doctrine, and discusses other factors for
courts to consider that are relevant despite not being captured in Shell's
one-sentence test. This article concludes by arguing that a more flexible
reading of the Shell opinion comports best with the developmental
roots of the challenge rule, with the Supreme Court's tendency to
repudiate rigidity in Federal Circuit jurisprudence, and with the federal
patent policies underlying Lear and its progeny.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHELL'S TEST AND ITS UNDERLYING
POLICIES
A. Lear-Incentivizing Prompt Validity Challenge
In the 1969 decision Lear v. Adkins, the Supreme Court held that,
contrary to some prior case law, a patent licensee generally is no longer
estopped from challenging the validity of the licensed patents.26 The
court reasoned that the policies motivating the doctrine of licensee
estoppel were generally outweighed by the federal patent policy of
encouraging prompt challenges to the validity of overbroad patents,
thereby "permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which
are in reality a part of the public domain." 27 Thus the Court in Lear
"explicitly abolished licensee estoppel," that is to say, "Lear resolved
the issue of licensee estoppel by writing its obituary....
26. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969).
27. Id at 670; see also Am. Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp., 526 F.2d 542, 546-47 (3d Cir.
1975) ("We read the Supreme Court's opinion in Lear as resolving the competing equities between
the licensee and the licensor in favor of the licensee." (emphasis added)).
28. Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also RCA
Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Lear abrogated the doctrine
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As explained by the Supreme Court ten years later, the general
holding of Lear is that "a licensee who establishes that the patent is
invalid need not pay the royalties accrued under the licensing
agreement subsequent to the issuance of the patent."29 As the Supreme
Court unanimously reminded us just recently, the public "has a
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies ... are kept within
their legitimate scope," a patentee generally "should not be . .. allowed
to exact royalties for the use of an idea . .. that is beyond the scope of
the patent monopoly granted," and licensees should be encouraged to
"litigate questions of a patent's scope" and validity.30
The Supreme Court's general abrogation of licensee estoppel in
Lear was intended to incentivize prompt licensee challenges to the
validity of suspect patents and remove any incentive for licensors to
delay or postpone ultimate decisions on the validity of such licensed
patents. The Court explained that "federal policies would be
significantly frustrated if licensees could be required to continue to pay
royalties during the time they are challenging patent validity in the
courts," as this would "give the licensor an additional economic
incentive to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to
postpone the day of final judicial reckoning."" Interpreting Lear,
numerous circuit courts have recognized Lear's aims of encouraging
prompt validity challenge by the licensee, and discouraging the licensor
from engaging in dilatory tactics to postpone a final decision on patent
validity.32
of 'licensee estoppel' .... "); see also CHISUM, supra note 7, § 19.02[3][a] ("In Lear Inc. v. Adkins,
the Supreme Court abolished as inconsistent with federal patent and antitrust policy the doctrine
that a licensee was estopped from contesting the validity of a patent." (citation omitted)).
29. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979).
30. Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 851-52 (2014)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
31. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673 (emphases added).
32. See, e.g., Hull v. BrunswickCorp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 1983) ("One reason
Lear permits licensees to suspend royalty payments prior to a final judicial determination of
validity is to discourage licensors from delaying such determination."); Rite-Nail Packaging Corp.
v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Federal patent policies favoring early
adjudication of patent validity prevail over the provisions of state law and private contract in
determining whether to award unpaid royalties accrued under an invalid patent."); PPG Indus.,
Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that the policy
"underlying" Lear was to encourage "early adjudication of invalidity"); Cordis Corp. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 995 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("In Lear, the Court examined the interests of
the licensor, the licensee, and the general public in light of the federal patent policy encouraging
prompt adjudication of patent validity . , . .").
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B. The Challenge Rule and Shell's Test-Holistically Applying
Lear
The Lear Court stated that "Lear must be permitted to avoid the
payment of all royalties accruing after Adkins' 1960 patent issued if
Lear can prove patent invalidity."" Similarly, in Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., the Court explained that "[i]n Lear, . . . [it] held that a
licensee who establishes that the patent is invalid need not pay the
royalties accrued under the licensing agreement subsequent to the
issuance of the patent."34 Such general statements, viewed in isolation,
might appear to preclude an award of pre-challenge royalties where a
patent is ultimately held invalid. But in light of Lear's focus on federal
patent policies, circuit courts fashioned exceptions to Lear's general
rule, where these policies so counseled.
The Federal Circuit in Shell found such an exception applicable,35
declining to rigidly apply the Supreme Court's broadest general
statements, reasoning aptly that in the "factual setting" before it,
enforcement of the license would not "frustrate federal patent policy."36
At the end of the decision, the court set forth a one-sentence test that
reads: "[A] licensee, such as Shell, cannot invoke the protection of the
Lear doctrine until it (i) actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii)
provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of
royalties is because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid."3 7
The Federal Circuit found that, under the circumstances of the case,
Shell (the licensee) had "delayed a timely challenge to the validity of
the '698 patent and postponed the public's full and free use of the
invention . ... "'I The court held that Shell remained liable for royalties
accrued before the validity challenge so as to create a disincentive for
33. Lear, 395 U.S. at 674.
34. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Advanced Card Techs. LLC v. Versatile Card Tech., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 158,
161 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Thus, the [Shell] exception to Lear applies."); Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767
F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("If the [Shell] exception does apply. . . ."). Some courts have
referred to the Shell court as declining to extend Lear rather than applying an exception to it. See,
e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ("[R]ecent
courts, including the Federal Circuit, have declined to extend Lear."). The author's view is that
Shell is consistent with Lear as a whole, but would be an exception to rigid application of Lear's
broadest general statements. Similarly, the holistic application of Shell advocated in this article is
consistent with the Shell opinion as a whole, but would create exceptions to a literal reading of
the one-sentence test set forth towards the end of the Shell opinion.
36. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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such delay; like Lear, Shell's aim was to prevent delay in validity
challenge.
Shell's test for invoking Lear developed from prior circuit court
cases applying Lear. The trend in these cases was not to relieve the
licensee of royalty obligations until the licensee stopped paying
royalties and gave some indication to the licensor that the reason it was
stopping payment was that it intended to challenge (or at least
questioned) the validity of the licensed patents.4 0 The purpose of this
challenge rule is to remove any incentive for the licensee to delay a
validity challenge so as to enjoy the benefits of the agreement for as
long as possible before later challenging validity.4' By removing such
incentive, the challenge rule furthers Lear's goal of incentivizing
prompt challenges to the validity of suspect patents.
One of the earliest cases that confronted the question of how to
apply Lear in a context relating to pre-challenge royalties was Troxel
Manufacturing Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., decided just three years
after the Supreme Court's Lear decision.42 In Troxel, the licensee was
attempting to recover royalties already paid under the license
agreement, in light of the fact that the licensed patent was subsequently
held invalid. Troxel argued that Lear held that payment of royalties on
an invalid patent could be avoided from the time the patent issued, and
not merely from the time the patent was declared to be invalid. In
support of its argument, Troxel cited the following broad language from
Lear: "[W]e hold that Lear must be permitted to avoid payment of all
royalties occurring after Adkins' 1960 patent issued if Lear can prove
patent invalidity."43
39. See Pony Pal, LLC v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14962, at *8-9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) ("The Federal Circuit's rationale in Shell Oil was that a licensee who
fails to challenge the validity of a patent benefits by retaining the protection of the license while
depriving the public of the fill and free use of the patented product by withholding a successful
challenge to validity. Accordingly, such a licensee should not be allowed to avoid liability for
royalties for any such time period on grounds of patent invalidity.").
40. See, e.g., Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1981);
see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 706 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Something
more than mere nonpayment is required to 'encourage an early adjudication of invalidity."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1257
(6th Cir. 1972))).
41. Shell, 112 F.3d at 1568; see also, e.g., Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1204
(10th Cir. 1983) ("Limiting the royalties licensees can avoid to those accruing after the licensees
effectively notify the licensors that they question the validity of the licensed patent prevents the
rule in Lear from being used to frustrate the policies enunciated there.").
42. Troxel, 465 F.2d at 1253.
43. Id. at 1259 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969)).
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But the Sixth Circuit rejected Troxel's attempt to rigidly apply this
language, recalling the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, that "[i]t
is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used."" Applying Marshall's maxim, the Sixth Circuit
held that a licensor need not repay all royalties received from its
licensee under a license agreement where the patent is subsequently
invalided. 45
The Troxel decision served as an example for other circuit courts
faced with interpreting the Lear decision, ultimately leading to the
Federal Circuit's Shell test. The next major step along this path appears
to have been PPG Industries, Inc. v. Westwood Chemical, Inc., a Sixth
Circuit case decided in 1976, just a few years after Troxel.46 PPG more
squarely presented the question of pre-challenge royalties that
ultimately led to the Federal Circuit's Shell test.47 The PPG court relied
upon Troxel, explaining that the full refund sought in Troxel would not
have promoted early adjudication of the invalidity of the patent, and
thus would have been contrary to the reasoning and federal patent
policies underlying the Lear decision.48
The court in PPG held that "a licensee can terminate its liability
for royalties under an invalid patent by ceasing payment for the purpose
of prompting an early adjudication of the invalidity of the patent."4 9
Because the court found that PPG's actions "were not of the type to
prompt an early adjudication of invalidity," the court held that PPG's
liability for royalties did not cease when PPG stopped paying
royalties." PPG stopped paying royalties as of 1968 and did not
challenge validity, or indicate that it would do so, until 197 1.' Thus
44. Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 398 (1821)).
45. Id.
46. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1976).
47. See id at 703 (explaining that PPG was not seeking a refund as in Troxel, but rather,
was attempting to avoid payment of royalties which had been withheld, as in Shell).
48. Id. at 705 ("If a full refund were granted on all royalties paid from the date of the
execution of the license agreement, the courts would be faced with a myriad of suits by licensees
who have waited until the patent is about to expire in the hope that the patent would be declared
invalid. Such a practice would encourage and reward the late adjudication of invalidity and defeat
the purposes of Lear." (alteration in original)).
49. Id. at 706.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 703 ("Although PPG withheld royalty payments, no notice was given to
Westwood as to the reasons for nonpayment. When Westwood inquired about the unpaid royalties,
PPG's chief patent counsel merely informed Westwood 'that he would look into it and see what
could be done."').
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PPG was not relieved of royalties until the time it filed suit in 1971.52
In other words, "[s]omething more than mere nonpayment is required
'to encourage an early adjudication of invalidity,"' in accordance with
the reasoning and federal patent policies underlying the Lear
decision.53
The Shell decision cited four circuit court cases in support of its
two-part test.54 The earliest case was PPG, and indeed, all of the other
three cases cite PPG, with some discussing it at length. 5 Thus Shell's
test has strong developmental roots in the Sixth Circuit's PPG decision,
which itself was based on Troxel's application of Marshall's maxim.
Marshall's maxim, in full, remains refreshingly insightful and
instructive 194 years later, and reads as follows:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit
when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this
maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other
principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their
relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other
cases is seldom completely investigated. 6
Given that the Federal Circuit's Shell one-sentence test for
invocation of Lear grew out of applying this maxim to broad general
statements in Lear, it would be rather incongruous for district courts to
treat Shell's two-part test rigidly, applying it without regard to the Shell
decision's equities and underlying federal patent policies. Marshall's
maxim should be just as applicable to Shell as it is to Lear. Although
the two factors of Shell's test can be instructive, their "possible bearing
on all other cases," could not have been "completely investigated" by
the Federal Circuit panel in Shell. Indeed, the dependence of Shell's
52. Id. at 701 ("[U]nder the facts and circumstances presented here, we hold that the
liability of the licensee terminated as of the date this suit was filed on January 18, 1971.").
53. Id. at 706 (alteration in original) (quoting Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465
F.2d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1972)).
54. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (citing Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933, 936-37 (9th Cir.
1983); Hull v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 1983); Am. Sterilizer Co. v.
Sybron Corp., 614 F.2d 890, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1980); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc.,
530 F.2d 700, 706, 708 (6th Cir. 1976)).
55. Rite-Nail, 706 F.2d at 936-37; Hull, 704 F.2d at 1203; Am. Sterilizer Co., 614 F.2d at
897-98.
56. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821).
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test on factual circumstances and policy considerations is reflected in
the very next paragraph immediately following the test." Pre-Shell
Federal Circuit applications of Lear also recognized that whether a
licensee may invoke the protection of Lear is "dependent on particular
fact situations," but "must be resolved in harmony with general
principles discernible from Lear."s8
C. Equities in Shell and Lear
Aside from the policy of incentivizing prompt validity challenges,
equities relating to inventorship appear to have been significant in both
Lear and Shell. After generally abrogating licensee estoppel in Lear,
the Supreme Court then considered the equities of the individual case
in view of federal patent policy." The licensor, "John Adkins, an
inventor and mechanical engineer, was hired by Lear . .. to develop a
gyroscope which would meet the increasingly demanding requirements
of the aviation industry."60 The Court found significant the fact that
Lear's license extended back "more than four years before Adkins
received his 1960 patent."6 ' The Court ultimately determined that,
"[w]hile the equities supporting Adkins' [the licensor's] position are
somewhat more appealing than those supporting the typical licensor,
we cannot say that there is enough of a difference to justify such a
substantial impairment of overriding federal policy. "62
Thus the equities in Lear favored the licensor, but not strongly
enough to override the policies of Lear's general rule against royalties
on invalid patents." However, a departure from Lear's general rule
against royalties on invalid patents was found to be justified in Shell,'
where the relevant equities and policies weighed even more strongly in
favor of the licensor, as the patents were only invalid due to the
licensor's own prior work. In other words, though the patents were
invalid, the licensor was still essentially the inventor of the licensed
technology. Thus in Shell, the equities weighed so strongly in favor of
57. Shell, 112 F.2d at 1568 ("In this factual setting, therefore, enforcement of the license
. . . does not frustrate federal patent policy." (emphases added)).
58. RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
59. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671-74 (1969).
60. Id. at 655.
61. Id. at 671.
62. Id. at 672-73.
63. Id. at 670 ("Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are
balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of
ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.").
64. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
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the licensor that, unlike in Lear, there was "enough of a difference
[from the typical licensor] to justify"6 5 an award of royalties on an
invalid patent.
The licensor in Shell was SGK, the licensing arm of the Max-
Planck Institute, a non-profit research and educational organization. 66
The licensed '698 patent was filed by Professor Karl Ziegler, a Nobel
laureate and past director of the Max-Planck Institute. 67 The licensed
'698 patent was held to be anticipated by Professor Zeigler's own
Belgian Patent No. 538,782.68 In declining to rigidly apply Lear, the
Shell court relied in part upon Diamond Scientific, a Federal Circuit
case which had declined to apply Lear to bar the invocation of assignor
estoppel, explaining that "[d]espite the public policy encouraging
people to challenge potentially invalid patents, there are still
circumstances in which the equities of the contractual relationships
between the parties should deprive one party . .. of the right to bring
that challenge."69
The equities favored the licensor in Shell because the invalidating
prior art was the licensor's own work, and furthermore, because the
licensee breached a notification obligation under the license. The
renegotiated agreement between Shell (the licensee) and SGK (the
licensor) was to one specific patent, the '698 Patent, and "obligated
Shell to give a yearly accounting of its entire polypropylene
production.""0 The court found this significant, explaining that "[b]y
abrogating its notification duty, Shell delayed a timely challenge to the
validity of the '698 patent and postponed the public's full and free use
of the invention," and that "Shell's apparent breach of its duty to notify
under the agreement is itself more likely to frustrate federal patent
policy than enforcement of the contract." '
Because Shell's test grew out of flexible and holistic application
of Lear, and because both Lear and Shell both explicitly and repeatedly
recognize the importance of the equities and federal patent policies to
their decisions,72 those equities and policies should be considered when
65. Lear, 395 U.S. at 672-73.
66. Shell, 112 F.3d at 1562.
67. Id.
68. See id at 1563; see also U.S. Pat. No. 3,082,197 col. I II. 17-18 (filed Dec. 1, 1958)
(describing the subject matter of Belg. Patent No. 538,782 (issued June 8, 1954)).
69. Shell, 112 F.3d at 1567 (quoting Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220,
1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1568.
72. See, e.g., id. at 1567-68; Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 672-73 (1969).
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applying Shell. Although Shell's one-sentence test provides important
guidance, it should not be considered exhaustive of all possible relevant
considerations. Such an approach comports best with the Supreme
Court's tendency to repudiate rigidity in Federal Circuit jurisprudence.
II. THE SUPREME COURT TREND AGAINST RIGID FEDERAL CIRCUIT
JURISPRUDENCE
Over the years since Shell was decided, the Supreme Court has
taken more of an interest in patent law. 73 One of the prevailing themes
in the Supreme Court's review of Federal Circuit jurisprudence is a
rejection of rigidity. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has
overruled Federal Circuit created "tests," in favor of more flexible,
"totality of the circumstances" type inquiries.74
This trend is in harmony with Justice Marshall's maxim, which
was part of the foundation out of which Shell's test developed from
Lear's general rule and policies. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
cited Justice Marshall's "sage observation," in overruling a Federal
Circuit opinion for being too rigid, stating:
We resist reading a single sentence unnecessary to the decision as
having done so much work. In this regard, we recall Chief Justice
Marshall's sage observation that "general expressions, in every
opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit
when the very point is presented for decision."
Although this recent Supreme Court statement was made in
reversing a Federal Circuit Fifth Amendment constitutional-takings
case rather than a patent case,76 there have been many patent cases over
the past two decades rejecting a rigid Federal Circuit approach. Perhaps
most applicable to Shell's test is the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in Bilski v. Kappos, where the Court held that, although the
73. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 25, at 7 (2010) ("Starting about a decade and a half ago, the
Supreme Court has more aggressively asserted its appellate jurisdiction over the Federal
Circuit.").
74. See sources cited supra note 25.
75. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 520 (2012) (quoting
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
76. Id. at 515 ("Reversing the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, which awarded
compensation to the Commission, the Federal Circuit held, 2 to 1, that compensation may be
sought only when flooding is 'a permanent or inevitably recurring condition, rather than an
inherently temporary situation.' We disagree and conclude that recurring floodings, even if of
finite duration, are not categorically exempt from Takings Clause liability." (citation omitted)).
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Federal Circuit's "machine-or-transformation test is a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool," it "is not the sole test" for
evaluating patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101.77 The Court explained
that "in deciding whether previously unforeseen inventions qualify as
patentable 'process[es],' it may not make sense to require courts to
confine themselves to asking the questions posed by the machine-or-
transformation test."78 Similarly, when deciding whether a licensor is
entitled to pre-challenge royalties accrued under an invalid patent,
under factual circumstances that are significantly different and thus
potentially unforeseen by the Shell court, it does not necessarily make
sense to confine courts to rigidly applying Shell's test. Although Shell's
test and the Shell opinion as a whole should certainly be considered as
a guidepost, that one-sentence should not be obstinately applied.
Rather, the policies underlying the test should be understood, and
applied to the fact situation before the court.
Other Supreme Court cases are similarly instructive against
rigidity in Federal Circuit jurisprudence. For example, in KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court began "by rejecting the rigid
approach of the [Federal Circuit] Court of Appeals" to non-
obviousness, one of the most important doctrines in patent law.79 The
Federal Circuit had applied the "TSM" test, "under which a patent
claim is only proved obvious if 'some motivation or suggestion to
combine the prior art teachings' can be found in the prior art, the nature
of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in
the art."80 The Court found this approach too rigid, stating that: "our
precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise
teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.""1
As another example, in MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech Inc., the
Federal Circuit had held that a "reasonable apprehension of suit" was
necessary in order to satisfy the Article III case-or-controversy
requirement in the declaratory judgment context, but the Supreme
Court rejected this test as inconsistent with its prior (non-patent law)
77. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010).
78. Id. at 606 (alternation in original).
79. KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) ("We begin by rejecting the rigid
approach [to nonobviousness] of the [Federal Circuit] Court of Appeals.").
80. Id. at 407 (citing, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-24 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
81. Id.at418.
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precedent.8 2 The Court replaced the Federal Circuit's test with a more
flexible and more general test, quoting a collision-insurance case which
stated: "Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment."83 In passing, the Court in MedImmune
mentioned Shell's two-part test, but did not express an opinion on it, as
it was not squarely at issue.84
Bilski, KSR, and MedImmune all involved Supreme Court
rejection of a Federal Circuit test for being too rigid.5 In all three cases,
the test was not entirely off the mark-it involved an important inquiry
and in many cases would provide the correct result, but the Supreme
Court held that it would not always provide the correct result, and thus
should be considered along with other factors, including the Court's
prior precedent as a whole.86 Rigid application of Shell's test runs
counter to this trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence. However, Shell
can be read in harmony with the trend by applying the decision as a
whole in light of its factual circumstances and reasoning. While Shell's
two-part test marks an important inquiry, it is not the end-all be-all and
should not necessarily dictate the result in every case.
More recently, in Octane Fitness, L.L. C. v. Icon Health & Fitness,
Inc., the Court again admonished the Federal Circuit for being "unduly
rigid," in the framework it had established for willfulness.87 Other
examples of the Supreme Court's more flexible or generalist approach
82. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007) (explaining that
the Court's prior decision in Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943), "contradict[s] the Federal
Circuit's 'reasonable apprehension of suit' test," and that the "test also conflicts with our
decision[] in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal. & Oil Co. . . ., where jurisdiction obtained
even though the collision-victim defendant could not have sued the declaratory judgment plaintiff-
insurer without first obtaining a judgment against the insured.").
83. Id. at 127 (quoting Md. Casualty Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
84. Id. at 124-25 ("We express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiating licensee is
similarly relieved of its contract obligations during a successful challenge to a patent's validity-
that is, on the applicability of licensee estoppel under these circumstances." (citing
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[A]
licensee . . . cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i) actually ceases payment
of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties
is because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid.")).
85. See supra notes 77-84 and corresponding text.
86. See supra notes 77-84 and corresponding text.
87. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014) ("The
framework established by the Federal Circuit in Bmoks Furniture is unduly rigid .... ).
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to patent law can be found in the areas of prosecution history estoppel,'
federal jurisdiction over state law claims,89 and injunctive relief.90
Numerous commentators have also recognized this trend in the
Supreme Court's review of Federal Circuit jurisprudence. 1 As stated
by Professor Peter Lee: "Starting about a decade and a half ago, the
Supreme Court has more aggressively asserted its appellate jurisdiction
over the Federal Circuit . . . . systematically favoring 'holistic'
standards over formulistic rules in a variety of areas of patent
doctrine." 92 Professor Lee explains that while "the Federal Circuit's
rule-based doctrine is overwhelmingly 'inquiry-truncating,' the
Supreme Court's new standards compel decision-makers to engage in
multi-factored examinations of inventions and their technological
context," so as to promote accuracy in decision making by requiring
more detailed analysis of the factual context.93 Similarly, rigid
application of Shell's test would be "inquiry truncating," whereas
consideration of the Shell opinion as a whole, in view of its facts and
reasoning and in concert with Lear, would promote accuracy.
This Supreme Court trend away from rigidity in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence has occurred concurrently with a related Supreme Court
tendency to substantively constrain and narrow patent rights in a
number of areas.94 This has coincided with a general sentiment that the
patent system is not functioning correctly.95 The Shell court referred to
Lear as having spoken in "tones that echo from a past era of skepticism
88. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737 (2002)
(rejecting the Federal Circuit's formalistic complete-prosecution-history bar in favor of a more
flexible approach which "requires an examination of the subject matter surrendered by the
narrowing amendment").
89. See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (rejecting the Federal Circuit's rule that
jurisdiction lies wherever a question of patent law is a necessary element of a state-law malpractice
claim, in favor of the standard four-factor test for whether there is a federal jurisdiction over a
state-law claim, which includes an inquiry into whether the issue is of substantial importance to
the federal system as a whole).
90. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (rejecting the
Federal Circuit's general rule in favor of permanent injunctions, holding that the traditional four-
factor test applies "with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act," and admonishing
the Federal Circuit that "a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not
be lightly implied." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court-And
Vice Versa, supra note 25, at 805 (suggesting that well-articulated policy "is a tool that might
replace at least some of the Federal Circuit's famous rigidity").
92. Lee, supra note 25, at 7.
93. Id. at 46-47.
94. See supra cases cited note 23.
95. See supra note 24.
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over intellectual property principles." 96 Lear was indeed originally
heavily criticized in the patent community as being too anti-patent.97
Commentators and courts alike have noted that the Federal Circuit has
displayed a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the Lear doctrine.98 But
the recent anti-patent trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence and in the
patent community at large, much of which occurred after the Shell
decision, appears to show that the "era of skepticism over intellectual
property" 99 has not entirely passed.o
96. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1567 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
97. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow
Reasoning Lead to Thin Law?, The Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in
Intellectual Property Law (Mar. 16, 1999), in 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (1999) ("Lear is,
in certain circles in the patent community, a much, much despised decision because of its anti-
patent tone."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive
to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 680 (1986) ("Small, specialized, non-integrated research firms .
. . can avoid risk only by shifting it to their licensees. Under Lear, their ability to do so is severely
restricted.").
98. CHISUM, supra note 7, § 19.02[3] ("Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit have displayed a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for extending the Lear doctrine."); see also
Bleeker & O'Shaughnessy, supra note 22, at 403 ("It is worth noting that the court's fundamental
unease with Lear is manifest throughout Shell."); Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F.
Supp. 2d 1000, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ("Perhaps these Federal Circuit cases reflect the sentiment,
expressed in the 1997 [Shell] decision, that Lear reflects 'tones that echo from a past era of
skepticism over intellectual property principles."'); Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment at 15, Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. EDCV 05-426-VAP (C.D. Cal. Mar.
27, 2014) ("Since Lear, however, the Federal Circuit has expressed doubt about its continuing
viability, commenting that the holding in Lear embodies 'tones that echo from a past era of
skepticism over intellectual property principles."' (quoting Shell)).
99. Shell, 112 F.3d at 1567.
100. A third related interpretation of the Supreme Court's involvement in patent law over
the past decade and a half is that the court has been moving the Federal Circuit in a more generalist
direction, discarding tests unique to patent law in favor of more generalized standards applicable
in other areas of law. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Broadening Federal Circuit Jurisprudence:
Moving Beyond Federal Circuit Patent Cases, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 19, 21 (2010) ("In
several recent cases, the Supreme Court has pushed the Federal Circuit to consider history and
doctrine arising from other areas of law."); Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from
the Supreme Court-And Vice Versa, supra note 25, at 795 ("[T]he Supreme Court has made
smallish doctrinal adjustments intended to keep patent law in the mainstream."); Lee, supra note
25, at 77 (2010) ("[T]he Court's relative insulation from patent law, as well as its generalist
outlook, has made it skeptical of patent 'exceptionalism."'); Andrew C. Michaels, An Infamous
Illustration of Patent Infringement Pleading: Form 18 and Context-Specificity, 19 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 286, 303 (2013) ("There has been a recent theme in Supreme Court jurisprudence that
patent litigation is not exceptional and is subject to the same procedural rules and standards as all
other litigation in federal courts."). All three of these trends, against rigid jurisprudence,
substantively narrowing patent rights, and away from patent exceptionalism, could potentially be
explained by the Supreme Court's more generalist outlook and its pursuit of broader goals as
compared with the Federal Circuit. See Lee, supra note 25, at 46.
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The Supreme Court's tendency to repudiate rigidity and
formalism in Federal Circuit jurisprudence counsels against a robotic
or rigid application of Shell's test. Particularly given that Shell itself
evolved from a flexible and holistic interpretation of the Supreme
Court's Lear decision, it seems unlikely that the Court would endorse
a rigid interpretation of Shell's limitations on Lear. The likelihood of
such an endorsement seems even lower in light of the Court's recent
tendency to narrow patent rights, and the fact that rigid application of
Shell's test could unnecessarily broaden patent rights, operating to
require a licensee to pay royalties on an invalid patent in a manner
contrary to equities and federal patent policy.
As such, this article urges a holistic application of Shell and a
flexible reading of Shell's test. As discussed below, at least one court
has already taken such an approach.' 0 '
III. APPLICATIONS OF SHELL'S TEST-THE IMPORTANCE OF
CONTEXT
Courts have taken varying approaches to the application of Shell's
test, with some apparently feeling compelled to apply it more rigidly
than others.
A. Icon Health-Rigid Application of Shell 's Test
In Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Park City Entertainment, Inc.,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah displayed a rigid
approach to Shell's test.'02 Icon was a company developing and selling
exercise equipment, which held patents covering some such equipment,
and licensed some such patents to Park City.o3 A dispute later arose as
to whether the patents covered only single pivot treadmills and as such
whether Park City was required to pay royalties only on single pivot
treadmills.' 04 Icon, the licensor, filed a complaint on Nov. 23, 2010 for
breach of contract and unfair competition, and then amended the
complaint on July 11, 2011, adding causes of action for patent
infringement on U.S. Patent Nos. 5,772,560 ('560 Patent) and
5,674,453 ('453 Patent).' Park City formally challenged the validity
101. Medimmune, Inc, v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (discussed
infra Part lll[B]).
102. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Park City Entm't, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-195-RJS, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 112045 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2013).
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id at *4.
105. Id
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of each patent but at different times, challenging the '560 Patent on
December 14, 2010, and the '453 Patent on August 1, 2011.106
The case was stayed on November 1, 2011, for a PTO
reexamination that ultimately invalidated the asserted claims.i0 7 The
parties agreed that Lear operated to excuse Park City from royalties
accrued after the dates of challenge, but disputed whether Park City
owed royalties which had accrued before the dates of challenge.os The
court applied Shell to hold that "Park City cannot resort to the Lear
defense to excuse payment of overdue royalties related to the '560
Patent accruing before it filed its Answer on December 14, 2010, nor
overdue royalties related to the '453 Patent accruing before it filed its
Amended Answer on August 1, 201 1.109 The court found Park City's
attempts to distinguish Shell were "spirited but ultimately
unpersuasive."i 10
In so holding, the court set forth a quite rigid view of Shell's test.
For example, Park City argued that Shell involved the breach of a notice
provision in the contract requiring the licensee to notify the licensor of
certain activities covered under the license, but that no such notice
provision was present in the Icon/Park City license agreement."'
Indeed, this notice provision appeared to be a significant factor in the
Shell decision, featured prominently in the very paragraph in which
Shell's test is found:
Shell's apparent breach of its duty to notify under the agreement is
itself more likely to frustrate federal patent policy than enforcement
of the contract. As already noted, Lear focused on the "full and free
use of ideas in the public domain." By abrogating its notification
duty, Shell delayed a timely challenge to the validity of the '698
patent and postponed the public's full and free use of the invention
of the '698 patent. Shell enjoyed the protection of the license from
1987 until SGK became aware of the Seadrift Process. Upon SGK's
discovery of its Seadrift process, Shell suddenly seeks the protection
of the Lear policies it flaunted for many years. However, a licensee,
such as Shell, cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until
it (i) actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to
106. Id. at *4.
107. Id. at *4-5.
108. Id. at *10-ll.
109. Id. at *28.
110. Id. at *14.
111. See id. at *15.
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the licensor that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is
because it has deemed the relevant claims to be invalid.l12
The Shell decision thus emphasized Shell's breach of its duty to
notify as one of the primary reasons that Lear's own policies counseled
against application of Lear under the circumstances, that is, "[bly
abrogating its notification duty, Shell delayed a timely challenge to ...
validity.""' Yet because the notification duty was not captured within
the one-sentence test immediately following this discussion, the Icon
Health court called Park City's factual distinction "irrelevant," stating:
"Nothing in the Kohle [Shell] decision suggests it is limited to cases
involving a contractual duty to notify, and the court there did not rely
on the notice provision in fashioning the two prerequisites to Lear
protection."'"1 Later, the court states: "Neither Kohle [Shell] nor Hull"'
suggest any authority for a trial court to relieve licensees of the
prerequisites identified in the cases, and Park City cites no case
supporting the existence of such broad discretion.""'
The Icon Health court's rigid application of Shell's test essentially
reduces the entire decision down to one sentence, ignoring its lengthy
discussion of federal patent policy in light of the facts and equities of
the case, and also ignoring the paragraph immediately following the
test in which the Shell court states: "In this factual setting, therefore,
enforcement of the license according to its terms, even if this entails a
112. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (emphases added) (citation omitted).
113. Id.
114. Icon Health, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112045, at *15.
115. As noted earlier, Hull is a Tenth Circuit case which Shell cited for support. In a footnote
of the Icon Health decision, the Utah District Court discusses whether to apply Hull or Shell, that
is, whether the issue is one of Federal Circuit law or regional circuit law. The court does not
definitively decide, stating that the result would be the same under either, but suggests that
"Federal Circuit law likely applies because the prerequisites to Lear are unique questions
regarding the interaction of patent principles with royalties . . . ." Icon Health, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112045 at *12 n.l ("We apply [Federal Circuit law] with respect to issues of substantive
patent law and also with respect to certain procedural issues pertaining to patent law; we apply
the law of regional circuits on non-patent issues.") (alteration in original) (citing Aero Products
Int'l, Inc. v. Intex Recreation Corp., 466 F.3d 1000, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Because, in the
author's view, the inquiry of when royalties are due on invalid patents or when Lear operates to
relieve a patent licensee of such royalties is (or at least should be) dependent on federal patent
policy considerations and equities relating to inventorship, the author agrees that it is properly
considered a matter of Federal Circuit law. Cf Advanced Card Techs. LLC v. Versatile Card Tech.,
Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("1 have not found any Second Circuit case
adopting the [Shell] exception .... [T]he Federal Circuit's primacy in matters pertaining to patent
law is such that, in the absence of direct Second Circuit precedent on the point, it is appropriate
to rely on [Shell] and to apply it to this case.").
116. Icon Health, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112045, at *17.
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determination of whether the Seadrift process infringes a now-
invalidated patent, does not frustrate federal patent policy."'17 Perhaps
one reason for this is that Park City may have made overreaching
arguments in the other direction. According to the Icon Health court,
Park City argued that "Lear stands for the far-reaching proposition that
once a patent is invalidated, the licensee escapes liability for any unpaid
royalties that ever accrued under that invalid patent.""8 Such a reading
is not persuasive because it would essentially eviscerate the challenge
rule. The correct method is a middle-ground approach in which Shell is
neither eviscerated nor rigidly reduced to one sentence; rather, the
opinion should be considered as a whole in light of its facts and
underlying policies. An excellent example of such an approach is found
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California's
MedImmune decision in 2008.
B. Medlmmune-Holistic Application of the Shell Decision
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,"' the District Court for
the Central District of California was faced with Genentech's motion
for summary judgment of patent validity.1 20 The parties had entered into
a license agreement whereby Medlmmune agreed to pay royalties on
products that would (if not licensed) infringe U.S. Patent No. 6,331,415
('415 Patent).121 Medlmmune continued to pay royalties "under
protest," but brought a declaratory judgment case for, inter alia,
invalidity of the '415 Patent.1 22
On motion for summary judgment, Genentech (the licensor)
argued that Medlmmune's invalidity challenge was barred by the
doctrine of licensee estoppel.1 2 3 Although licensee estoppel was
generally abrogated by the Supreme Court in Lear,124 the Federal
Circuit in Shell held that a licensee could not "invoke the protection of
the Lear doctrine until it (i) actually ceases payment of royalties, and
117. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
118. Icon Health, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112045, at *12.
119. 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
120. Id at 1003.
121. Id. at 1002-03.
122. See id. at 1003.
123. See id. at 1012.
124. Id. at 1018 n.15 ("It has generally been observed by the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit, other courts, and commentators, that Lear spelled the end of the licensee estoppel
doctrine." (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 345 (1971);
Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Timely Prods., Inc. v.
Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 95 (D. Conn. 1979); CHisuM, supra note 7, § 19.02[3][a])).
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(ii)" challenged the validity of the patent. 125 Genentech argued that
because MedImmune was continuing to pay royalties (albeit under
protest), it did not meet the first prong of Shell's test, and therefore
could not invoke Lear to escape licensee estoppel.1 26
The MedImmune court, however, rejected Genentech's argument.
The court recognized that the "language of [Shell] appears to bar
Medlmmune's invocation of Lear because it has not 'cease [d] payment
of royalties' as required by first prong of the [Shell] rule," but found
that "that language taken out of context extends the holding far beyond
the rest of the case."l27 in contrast to the Icon Health court, which
deemed that the factual circumstances of Shell not captured in Shell's
one-sentence test were "irrelevant," the Medlmmune court found these
circumstances highly significant, explaining:
The holding [of Shell] concerned whether Shell could be held liable
for past-due royalties where patent was later held invalid, in light of
the fact that Shell had delayed adjudication of invalidity by
clandestinely continuing to operate under the agreement . . . .
Fundamentally, Shell's abrogation [of its notification duty] was at
odds with the federal policy that justified the Lear decision. In this
case, MedImmune did not abrogate its notification duty .... Indeed,
it would 'frustrate federal patent policy,' as embodied by Lear, to
prohibit MedImmune from asserting invalidity . . . . Where the
Federal Circuit distinguished Lear in a patent license case in [Shell],
it did so because the rationale for Lear was undermined where a
licensee failed to challenge validity until the licensor discovered
breach of the agreement. None of those policy-altering distinctions
are relevant here.' 28
The Medlmmune court accordingly applied Lear because it felt
that the policies underlying Lear and Shell were better served by
application of Lear, rather than Shell's exception to Lear, even though
Shell's test for invocation of Lear was not strictly met. For support, the
court cited Levenger Co. v. Feldman, a case from the U.S. District
125. See Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
126. Medlmmune, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (Genentech "notes that the Federal Circuit in
[Shellj[] expressly imposes a repudiation requirement on the invocation of Lear. Because that
requirement has not been met, Genentech reasons, Medlmmune is estopped from challenging
patent validity.").
127. Id. at 1016-17 (alteration in original) (quoting Shell, 112 F.3d at 1568).
128. Id. at 1017-18 (citation omitted). The Medimmune court also recognized that the
Federal Circuit's decision in Shell may have been driven in part by its view that the Supreme
Court in Lear spoke in "tones that echo from a past era of skepticism over intellectual property
principles." Id. at 1015 (quoting Shell, 112 F.3d at 1567).
2015] 567
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
Court for the Southern District of Florida in which the court refused to
apply Shell because the "balance of the equities" was "not similar to
that present in Shell Oil where the party who enjoyed the protection of
the license for a number of years, did not challenge the patent, but only
sought the protection of Lear once the licensor accused it of engaging
in infringing conduct."l 2 9
Medlmmune serves as an excellent example of the type of analysis
advocated in this article, flexibly applying Shell as a whole, in light of
its factual circumstances, underlying equities, and federal patent policy
considerations, rather than rigidly applying its one-sentence test.130
C. Jang-Federal Circuit Denies Interlocutory Review
In a recent case, Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp., the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California again recognized that Shell's
test need not necessarily be rigidly applied under all circumstances."'
Dr. Jang obtained two patents in 1999 relating to coronary stents, and
in 2002 executed an assignment agreement whereby he conveyed his
rights in those patents to Boston Scientific (BSC), in exchange for
royalty payments based on a percentage of BSC's net sales that absent
the agreement would infringe the assigned patents. 132 A dispute arose
as to whether royalties were owed on certain of BSC's products, and
Dr. Jang sued for breach of contract to collect the royalties he believed
to be owed. 13 3 BCS initially contended that royalties were not owed
because its products would not "infringe" or were not covered by the
two patents, but then in 2006 first argued that the patents could also be
129. Levenger Co. v. Feldman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54917, at *10 (S.D. Fla. July 30,
2007). It should be noted that in a later order in the same case, the Levenger court ultimately
decided in favor of applying Shell. See Levenger Co. v. Feldman, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1290
(S.D. Fla. 2007).
130. Although the prong of Shell's test that was technically not met in MedImmune was the
first prong (the licensee had not ceased payment), and this article focuses more on the second
prong (challenge to validity), MedImmune provides a good example of reading Shell's test in light
of the decision as a whole. The court's consideration of the factual circumstances of Shell
including the licensee's breach of its notification duty, and the effect of such circumstances on the
underlying policies, could be equally applicable in a situation where the second prong of Shell's
test is not strictly met, as explained further infra Part IV[A].
131. See Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Jang v.
Bos. Sci. Corp., No. EDCV 05-426-VAP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014); Minute Order Granting
Defendants' Motion to Certify Questions for Interlocutory Appeal at 15, Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp.,
No. EDCV 05-426-VAP (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014).
132. See Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Jang v.
Bos. Sci. Corp., No. EDCV 05-426-VAP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27,2014). Although the agreement was
technically an assignment rather than a license, the presence of the royalty payments makes the
situation more or less akin to an exclusive license agreement for purposes of the challenge rule.
133. Id. at 2.
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invalid.'34 The district court initially construed the claims narrowly so
that there was no "infringement," but the Federal Circuit reversed in
2012, requiring a broader claim construction.' The patents were
ultimately invalidated by the USPTO on reexamination in 2014.16
When the case resumed, the district court was faced with the
question of whether BSC was liable for royalties accrued under the
invalid patents.' 37 Under Shell, BCS would seem to owe royalties until
2006 when it first challenged the validity of the patents. But the court
questioned whether Shell should apply under circumstances where
there was no alleged delay by the licensee/assignee. The court found
that there was a "paucity of law" on the subject, and that there was
"substantial grounds for difference of opinion" based on the "unique
nature of the underlying facts."' As such, the court decided to certify
the following two questions for interlocutory appeal:
1. Where an assignor is suing under an assignment agreement for
payments allegedly due for practicing claims now determined to be
invalid, and where there is no allegation of dishonest or dilatory
conduct on the part of the assignee, does the exception to Lear v.
Adkins, identified in Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil
Co., apply?
2. If the [Shell] exception does apply, what is the appropriate
standard for its application where the assignee has never made
payments on sales of the accused product and has consistently
maintained that no such payments could be due because the claims
cannot properly be construed to cover the accused product and
would be invalid under any construction that did not cover the
accused product?' 39
134. Id. at 16.
135. See id. at 2; Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17731, at *14 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 22, 2012) (finding that the district court "impermissibly imported the 'unattached' limitation
into the claims based on the examples in the specification.").
136. See Minute Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Jang v.
Bos. Sci. Corp., No. EDCV 05-426-VAP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014). In an interesting twist, the
request for ex parte re-examination was filed by Boston Scientific Corp. (BSC), the
licensee/assignee, and BSC did not contest the PTO's initial finding of invalidity, despite its right
to do so as the owner of the challenged patents. Dr. Jang filed an ex parte application for a
temporary restraining order seeking to compel BSC to relinquish power of attorney over the
licensed/assigned patents and allow Dr. Jang to defend the patents in the re-examination
proceedings, but the court denied the request. Id These circumstances whereby Dr. Jang was
prevented from defending the validity of the licensed patents may have contributed somewhat to
the Jang court's confusion as to how Shell should be applied.
137. Id at 14.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Jang v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
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The Federal Circuit denied interlocutory review, stating without
much explanation that it was not "clear that the legal issues identified
in the questions will in fact be controlling, and each question depends
on the resolution of factual issues not yet addressed by the district
court."l40 The Federal Circuit explicitly did not take "any position on
the merits of the issues presented." 4 1
The lack of an "allegation of dishonest or dilatory conduct" on the
part of the licensee in the Jang case does not seem to necessarily justify
a departure from Shell's test. The inquiry should focus on federal patent
policies and creating the appropriate incentive structure, rather than on
a strict requirement that one party must prove or allege dishonest or
dilatory conduct on the part of the other.1 42 However, the Jang case
provides another good example of a court employing the general
approach advocated in this article, evaluating the facts before it in light
of the underlying reasoning and policies of Lear and Shell, rather than
rigidly applying Shell's test. The next part discusses some types of
factual situations that, in the author's view, would justify departure
from Shell's test.
IV. RELEVANT FACTORS NOT CAPTURED IN SHELL'S TEST
Although Shell's test achieves the correct result in many
situations, the scenarios examined in this section illustrate how the
policies and equitable considerations underlying Lear and Shell are
better served by a more flexible application of Shell's test. Factors not
captured in Shell's one-sentence test, including the structure of the
license agreement, and the nature of the invalidating prior art, can be
important considerations in reaching a result consistent with the
policies underlying Lear and Shell as a whole.
140. Id. at 1339.
141. Id. ("Without taking any position on the merits of the issues presented, we conclude
that the limited circumstances under which an interlocutory appeal might be permitted are not met
in this case.").
142. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969) ("Enforcing this contractual
provision would give the licensor an additional economic incentive to devise every conceivable
dilatory tactic in an effort to postpone the day of final judicial reckoning. We can perceive no
reason to encourage dilatory court tactics in this way.") (emphases added); Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (the holdings of Lear "relied on the desirability of encouraging
licensees to challenge the validity of patents, to further the strong federal patent policy that only
inventions which meet the rigorous requirements of patentability shall be withdrawn from the
public domain") (emphases added); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Westwood Chem., Inc., 530 F.2d 700, 706
(6th Cir. 1975) (declining to apply Lear to pre-challenge royalties because the "actions of PPG in
the present case in ceasing payment of royalties were not of the type to prompt an early
adjudication of invalidity").
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A. The Structure of the License Agreement
As discussed supra, the primary federal patent policy explicitly
recognized in both Lear and Shell was to promote early adjudication of
invalidity and remove any incentive for either party to delay. The Lear
Court reasoned that if royalties continued to be owed until the patent
were declared invalid, that would be "inconsistent with federal patent
policy" in that it would "give the licensor an additional economic
incentive to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to
postpone the day of final judicial reckoning," and thereby "encourage
dilatory court tactics." 43
Whether invocation of Lear would encourage or discourage delay
depends to some extent on the structure of the license agreement at
issue. In Shell, the court declined to apply Lear because it found that
given the factual circumstances of that case, including the structure of
the license agreement, invocation of Lear would encourage delay and
thereby turn Lear's federal patent policy on its head. The court
explained that "[b]y abrogating its notification duty, Shell delayed a
timely challenge to the validity of the '698 patent and postponed the
public's full and free use of the invention."'"
The structure of the license agreement as related to Shell's delay
was thus an important factor in the Shell decision, although not
explicitly captured in Shell's one-sentence test. The renegotiated
agreement between Shell (the licensee) and SGK (the licensor) was to
one specific patent, the '698 Patent, and "obligated Shell to give a
yearly accounting of its entire polypropylene production."l 4 5
There was no question that Shell knew it was obligated to pay
royalties on polypropylene production under the '698 Patent, and Shell
was explicitly obligated to inform the licensor of its polypropylene
production activities. Shell had all the information that it needed in
order to challenge the validity of the '698 Patent, which it ultimately
did, successfully.' 4 6 But Shell delayed in that challenge, operating
under the protection of the license for years without informing SGK of
its polypropylene activities (and without paying for those activities) as
it was required to under the license.1 47 Application of Lear would have
allowed Shell to have its cake and eat it too; clandestinely enjoy the
143. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673; see also supra Part I[A].
144. Studiengesselschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
145. Id. at 1563.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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protection of the license until discovered, and then be excused from
paying royalties. The Shell court properly prevented this result, holding
that under those circumstances, Shell could only be relieved of royalties
from the time it challenged the validity of the patent.1 48
One of the only Federal Circuit cases squarely applying Shell's
test, Go Medical v. Inmed, involved a similar situation.1 4 9 Go Medical
licensed to MMG the exclusive right to distribute catheters under one
specific patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,652,259 ('259 Patent).' Thus, as in
Shell, there was no question that MMG was paying royalties under that
patent, and could have challenged the validity of that patent sooner.
And like Shell, MMG delayed in that challenge, attempting to enjoy the
benefits of the agreement for as long as possible.' 5 ' Indeed, as the
exclusive licensee, MMG urged Go Medical to sue C.R. Bard when it
entered the market with a competing catheter.1 52 It was not until after
the '259 Patent was found invalid in that suit that MMG stopped paying
royalties and challenged the validity of the patent.' Under these
circumstances, the Federal Circuit cited Shell in declining to allow
MMG to invoke the protection of Lear, finding it significant that MMG
was "trying to have it both ways."'54 Thus in both Shell and Go
Medical, the license was to one specific patent which the licensee
delayed in challenging, and the Federal Circuit appropriately declined
to encourage such delay. But in some situations, where the license is to
more than one patent, strict application of Shell's test could actually
encourage the licensor to delay.
For example, imagine a portfolio license where the licensor owns
hundreds of patents, and the license puts the obligation on the licensor
to inform the licensee of which of the licensee's products it believes
are covered under the license. Further suppose that the royalties owed
depend to some extent on the products covered. Now suppose that the
licensor notices that the licensee is making certain products it believes
are covered by one of its patents, but recognizes that the patent is of
questionable validity. The licensee is not paying royalties on these
products because it does not know that the licensor believes them to be
covered under this questionable patent. Under the license, the licensee
has no obligation to investigate the licensor's vast portfolio for patents
148. Id. at 1568.
149. See Go Med. Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
150. Id. at 1268.
151. Id.
152. Id
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1273.
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which might cover some of its products; the license puts that obligation
on the licensor.
In these circumstances, if Shell's test were always to be strictly
applied, the licensor would have a clear incentive to delay in informing
the licensee of its belief that royalties were owed on the questionable
patent. Imagine that after a period of say three years, the licensor
informs the licensee that a product the licensee has been producing is
covered by one of the licensor's patents, such that royalties for the past
three years are owed. The licensee then investigates the validity of the
patent, finds that it is likely invalid, and challenges its validity. Under
strict application of Shell's test, the licensee would still owe royalties
for the three year period preceding the challenge even if the patent were
found invalid. If the licensor had informed the licensee three years
earlier, the licensee would likely have challenged three years earlier.
The licensor would thus be rewarded for its delay with three years of
royalties on an invalid patent. This would turn the federal patent policy
underlying both Lear and Shell on its head by encouraging the type of
dilatory tactics that those decisions sought to discourage."I
Thus in this type of a portfolio license situation, Shell's test should
not be applied rigidly. Reasoned consideration of the Lear and Shell
decisions as a whole would reveal that the licensee should be allowed
to invoke Lear under such circumstances, in furtherance of the federal
patent policies and equities underlying this doctrine.
Such a situation is not so fanciful. Indeed a less extreme version
of this situation was presented in Icon Health. Park City challenged the
validity of Icon's '560 Patent in its original answer on December 14,
20 10.156 Then in July of 2011, Icon amended its complaint adding the
'453 Patent, and in August of 2011, Park City amended its answer to
add a challenge to the validity of the '453 Patent.'57 The district court
155. In such a situation, the licensee might have an argument that the licensor should be
equitably estopped from attempting to argue that Shell requires that royalties be paid during the
period of the licensor's own delay. Where the licensor, through delay in informing the licensee of
its view that royalties are owed on a certain patent of questionable validity, induces the licensee
to delay in challenging the validity of such patents, the licensor should not be heard to exploit its
own delay through a claim that additional royalties are owed even where the patent is invalid.
Without fully engaging the question of how the federal Lear/Shell doctrine would or should
interact with state law equitable estoppel in the context of a license dispute, the fact that rigid
application of Shell's test would, in some circumstances, appear to conflict with state law
equitable principles at least provides further persuasive support for a more flexible and holistic
application of Shell, particularly in light of the fact that equities were considered and emphasized
in both Lear and Shell. See supra Part l[C].
156. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Park City Entm't, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-195-RJS, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 112045, at *3-4 (D. Utah Aug. 7, 2013).
157. Id at *4.
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held that Park City was required to pay royalties on the invalid claims
for the period before December 2010 on the '560 Patent, and the period
before August 2011 on the '453 Patent.' If Park City had known that
the '453 Patent would be asserted by Icon, it likely would have
challenged its validity in December 2010 when it challenged the '560
Patent. Icon was thus rewarded for its delay in asserting the '453 Patent
with almost nine months of extra royalties on an invalid patent.
Park City apparently made an overreaching argument that Lear
precluded "liability for any unpaid royalties, irrespective of either the
dates Park City challenged the validity of the patents under the [i]icense
[a]greement or the dates that the royalties became due."l59 But it seems
that Park City would have had a strong argument that under the policies
of Lear and Shell as a whole, it should not have been required to pay
royalties on the invalid '453 Patent at least from December 2010, so
that Icon should not be rewarded for its nine month delay in asserting
the '453 Patent. The appropriate inquiry would have been whether Icon
was excused in its delay by any factual circumstances such as a breach
by Park City of a duty to notify Icon of its activities which would
infringe the '453 Patent (akin to the similar breach of a notification duty
in the Shell case). If not, it seems that such an argument by Park City
should prevail, even though it would be contrary to the letter of Shell's
one-sentence test.
One additional aspect of Shell's reasoning further confirms the
importance of the structure of the license agreement. In declining to
apply Lear, the Shell court relied on Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico,
Inc., a Federal Circuit case which had declined to apply Lear to bar the
invocation of assignor estoppel, explaining that "despite the public
policy encouraging people to challenge potentially invalid patents,
there are still circumstances in which the equities of the contractual
relationships between the parties should deprive one party . . . of the
right to bring that challenge."' In Diamond Scientific, the assignor
could not invoke Lear because it had made a representation of the
worth of the patent at the time of assignment to its advantage; to allow
the assignor to later repudiate that representation, again to its
advantage, would "work an injustice against the assignee."' 6 '
The Shell court declined to apply Lear in part because "as in
Diamond Scientific, Shell executed a contractual agreement which
158. Id. at *28.
159. Id.at*11.
160. Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
161. Id. at 1224.
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produced significant benefits for the corporation and attested to the
worth of the patent."l 6 2 This was true because the renegotiated license
was to one specific patent, such that the licensee, by entering into the
license agreement and continuing to operate under its protection for
years, had in some sense attested to the worth of that patent. But where
the license is a portfolio license to hundreds of patents, and it is not the
licensee's obligation to investigate each of them, then the licensee can
hardly be said to have attested to the validity of each patent in the
licensor's vast portfolio.
The structure of the license agreement, including the number of
patents covered, and any obligations to investigate or notify placed
upon the licensee, is thus an important consideration bearing on
whether the federal patent policies of Lear would be served by
awarding pre-challenge royalties in a particular case. Although this
consideration is not captured in Shell's one-sentence test, examination
of the Shell opinion as a whole reveals that it weighed as an important
part of Shell's factual circumstances. Thus, even though not captured
in Shell's one-sentence test, the structure of the license agreement
should be considered by courts in deciding whether to allow a licensee
to invoke Lear.
B. The Nature of the Invalidating Prior Art
As the above discussion of Shell's reliance on Diamond Scientific
highlights, the "equities of the contractual relationship between the
parties" was a significant factor in Shell.163 Equities were considered in
Lear as well, where the court found that the "equities of the licensor do
not weigh very heavily when they are balanced against the important
public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas
which are in reality a part of the public domain."'" Where the licensed
patent is found invalid, the nature of the invalidating prior art can bear
on these equities, and thus should be considered in deciding whether
the licensee must pay pre-challenge royalties. Where the patent is
invalid based on the licensor's own work, as in both Shell and Go
Medical, this factor should weigh against invocation of Lear. But
where the patent is invalid based on the licensee's own prior work, this
factor should weigh in favor of invocation of Lear.
162. Studiengesselsehaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell), 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
163. Id. at 1567 (quoting Diamond, 848 F.2d at 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also supra
Part I[C].
164. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
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1. Licensee's Own Prior Work
In Lear, the court determined that "[w]hile the equities supporting
Adkins' (the licensor's] position are somewhat more appealing than
those supporting the typical licensor, we cannot say that there is enough
of a difference to justify such a substantial impairment of overriding
federal policy."'6 5 But in Shell, the equities in favor of the licensor were
strong enough to work a departure from Lear, in part because the
licensed patent was invalid based on the Nobel laureate licensor's own
prior work.1 6 6 Go Medical similarly involved a situation where the one
licensed patent was invalid based on the inventor licensor's own prior
work; the "parties agreed that a 1982 article written by Dr. O'Neil
[founder of licensor Go Medical] anticipated the [licensed] '259
Patent."' 6 ' Thus in both Shell and Go Medical, although the licensed
patent was invalid, it was invalid based on the licensor's own work.
The license covered technology that the licensor had invented, so it was
not offensive to the equities to require the licensee to pay for pre-
challenge use of that technology even though the patent turned out to
be invalid.
But what if the invalidating prior art is the licensee's own prior
work? Imagine again a portfolio license situation as discussed above,'6 8
where the licensor later asserts a patent which turns out to be invalid
based on the licensee's own prior work. For example, imagine if the
licensed '453 Patent in Icon Health discussed above were anticipated
by a Park City patent on a Park City invention. It would seem highly
inequitable to require the licensee to pay for the use of technology that
it had itself invented, particularly where it may not have even realized
that it was entering into a license agreement that would purportedly
cover such technology.
In addition to being inequitable, requiring the licensee to pay for
the use of its own prior work would run counter to the strong federal
patent policy of protecting prior users from exactly such a result. As
explained by the Supreme Court, the right of an inventor to use its own
creation "existed before and without the passage of the law and was
always the right of an inventor."' 9 It was in part this "common-law
165. Id. at 672-73.
166. See Shell, 112 F.3d at 1563; see also U.S. Patent No. 3,082,197 col. I II. 17-18 (filed
Dec. 1, 1958) (describing the subject matter of Belg. Patent No. 538,782 (issued June 8, 1954)).
167. Go Med. Indus. Pty., Ltd. v. Inmed Corp., 471 F.3d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
168. See supra Part IV[A].
169. Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913); see also Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (explaining that the Patent Act of 1800 "may well be deemed merely affirmative
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right to make, use, and vend ... which induce[d] the Government to
clothe [an inventor or discoverer] with power to exclude everyone
else.""o To require a licensee to pay for the use of its own invention
would thus be an affront to federal patent policy, for as courts and
commentators alike have long recognized, it "is less serious to hold that
the first inventor has forfeited his right to a patent monopoly than it is
to hold that he has forfeited any right to use his own invention without
the permission of a subsequent inventor.""'
This long-standing policy of protecting prior users from having to
pay for the use of their own prior work is also reflected in the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which provides a defense to
infringement "based on prior commercial use."'72 Prior to the AIA, a
"prior user who did not abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention,"
could rely on section 102(g)(2) to "invalidate the later patent of another
and thereby escape liability for infringement.""' But with the AIA's
switch to a first-to-file patent system, it was necessary to enact the prior
commercial use defense in order to ensure that prior users could not be
forced to pay for the continued use of their own prior work.17 4
As a number of commentators have noted, courts have apparently
been more likely to find prior use public enough to be invalidating
of what would be the result from general principles of law," in that it "gives the right to the first
and true inventor and to him only").
170. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 36 (1923). See also
Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) ("The constitution and law, taken together,
give to the inventor, from the moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, which is
completed by suing out a patent.").
171. Dunlop Holdings, Ltd. v. RAM Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 36 n.Il (7th Cir. 1975); see
also F. Andrew Ubel, Who's on First?-The Trade Secret Prior User or a Subsequent Patentee,
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 401, 417 (1994) ("It is submitted that the loss of right to an
invention reflects entirely different equities from the loss of right to a patent. The inventor's right
to her invention vests naturally upon the use or working of the invention and without regard to the
patent system." (footnotes omitted)); Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications
of Recent Patent Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 329, 364-65 (1997) ("A prior party who is
using an invention before the filing date of another party wins the limited rights to continue the
use, despite the issuance of the patent to another inventor. Although this a departure from current
United States practice, it is deemed equitable." (citing Dunlop Holdings, 524 F.2d at 37)).
172. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2013).
173. See USPTO, REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE 48 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §
102(g)(2), amended by Leahy-Smith American Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011).
174. USPTO, supra note 173, at 48 ("The switch from first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file
is cited in the legislative history of the AIA as the main impetus behind the changes to section
273. One of the direct results of adopting a first-inventor-to-file regime is the elimination of
section 102(g)(2) of the current law." (footnote omitted)).
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when the prior use is by the defendant, as opposed to a third party.17
Indeed, according to Professor Karl F. Jorda:
[T]here is actually no case on the books where a first inventor/trade
secret owner has been enjoined from practicing his invention/trade
secret by a late-comer patentee even though there are literally scores
of cases . . . where the second inventor prevailed on the issue of
priority in an interference context.1 76
As explained by Justice Story, "no subsequent inventor has a right to
deprive [a prior user] of the right to use his own prior invention. . . .
[I]ndeed, this has been the habitual, if not invariable, interpretation of
all our patent acts from the origin of the government." 7 7 Thus where a
licensed patent is invalid based on the licensee's own prior work, this
should weigh against requiring pre-challenge royalties.
2. Expired Patents
Although invalidity based on the licensee's own prior work would
be the strongest form of invalidating prior art weighing in favor of
invocation of Lear, there are other instances where the nature of the
invalidating prior art could be significant, such as where the
invalidating prior art is an expired patent. The patent system provides
a grant of a limited monopoly in exchange for dedication of the
invention to the public after the patent expires, and courts have "long
held that after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of
the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of federal
175. Compare, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (finding that prior use by a third party, practicing the patented process to sell a product, was
not invalidating because the product did not adequately inform the public of the process), with
Friction Div. Products, Inc. v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 658 F. Supp. 998 (D. Del. 1987)
(finding the defendant's own secret prior use of a patented process invalidating). See also, e.g.,
Ubel, supra note 171, at 427-29 (illustrating the importance of prior user rights by comparing
WL. Gore with Friction Division, "where the defendant was a bona fide prior user" defending "on
the basis of their own prior use," as opposed to that of a third party); Pierre Jean Hubert, The Prior
User Right ofH.R. 400: A Careful Balancing ofCompeting Interests, 14 SANTA CLARACOMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 199-200 (1998) ("How does one reconcile Gore and Friction Division?
. . . Interestingly, courts may be drawing the distinction ... on the strength of the prior user's
interest based on the prior user's status as a defendant or a third party. The notion is that perhaps
a prior user's interest is strong enough to warrant invalidation of a second inventor's patent,
whereas a third-party infringer's interest is not.").
176. Karl F. Jorda, The Rights of the First Inventor-Trade Secret User as Against Those of
the Second Inventor-Patentee, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 593, 600 (1979); see also Karl F. Jorda,
Patent and Trade Secret Complimentariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 WASH BURN L. J. 1, 27
(2008) ("[A] later patentee has never enjoined a trade secret owner.").
177. Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435, 437 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
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law.""' In other words, the public dedication and "disclosure required
by the Patent Act is 'the quid pro quo of the right to exclude."'l 79 That
is, the "federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted
bargain," wherein "upon expiration of [the life of the patent], the
knowledge of the invention inures to the people, who are thus enabled
without restriction to practice it and profit by its use."'
In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co., the Supreme
Court declined to apply assignor estoppel where the patent was invalid
based on an expired patent, because to do so would be "inconsistent
with the patent laws which dedicate to public use the invention of an
expired patent."'"' Although Scott Paper involved assignor estoppel
rather than licensee estoppel, the two doctrines are analogous; indeed,
in abrogating the general rule of licensee estoppel, the Lear Court cited
Scott Paper as undermining its "very basis."'82 Similarly, in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boat, Inc., the Supreme Court explained
that "[w]here the public has paid the congressionally mandated price
for disclosure, the States may not render the exchange fruitless by
offering patent-like protection to the subject matter of the expired
patent."'83 The Court in Bonito Boats also cited Lear, noting that
careful consideration must be given to the "limited monopoly contained
in the federal scheme," so as not to conflict "with the federal policy
'that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good
unless they are protected by a valid patent."'l
84
This policy is invoked where a licensed patent is anticipated by an
expired patent, because in that situation the invention should rightfully
be a part of the public domain, and it would seem contrary to policy to
require the licensee to pay for it. Invalidity based on expired patents in
178. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989); see also
Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 572 (1893) ("[P]laintiffs' right to the use of the
embossed periphery expired with their patent, and the public had the same right to make use of it
as if it never had been patented."); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)
("It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and
the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.").
179. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,484 (1974)).
180. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933)).
181. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1945); see also
Rockwood Pigments NA, Inc. v. Axel J., L.P., No. 01-1227,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26527, at * 10
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2002) ("Axel is not, however, estopped from asserting that it is practicing the
prior art. . . ." (citing Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 249)).
182. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 666 (1969).
183. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
184. Id. at 159-60 (quoting Lear, 395 U.S. at 668).
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itself should not generally be considered sufficient reason for invoking
Lear rather than Shell. Indeed there exists at least one case where the
challenge rule was applied despite invalidity based on an expired
patent.'15 And it is perhaps not as strong of a factor in favor of
invocation of Lear as where invalidity is based on the licensee's own
prior work."' But it should be a factor to be considered in combination
with the other factors discussed above. For example, if invalidity is
based on some combination of expired patents and the licensee's own
prior work, perhaps this should be of sufficient weight that the licensee
should not be required to pay pre-challenge royalties on an invalid
patent, particularly in the context of a portfolio license.
CONCLUSION
The challenge rule, and the rule of Shell, developed out of a
holistic view of Lear and cases that declined to rigidly apply Lear's
broader general statements. The Lear and Shell decisions, as a whole,
strongly reflect the importance of the underlying equities and their
relation to federal patent policies. The challenge rule, and Shell's test,
resulted from a recognition that Lear's underlying policies were better
served in some circumstances by declining to rigidly apply Lear's
general statements, in accordance with Justice Marshall's maxim.18 7
Like Lear, Shell should similarly be applied holistically; its one-
sentence test should not be rigidly applied out of context. Rather, the
equities and policies underlying Lear and Shell as a whole should be
considered in deciding whether a licensee may invoke the protection of
Lear. A holistic and flexible application of Shell comports best not only
with the origination of Shell's test from Marshall's maxim and a
holistic and flexible application of Lear, but also with the Supreme
Court's trend of repudiating rigidity in Federal Circuit jurisprudence. 8
As with the machine-or-transformation test,1 89 the reasonable-
185. See Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.3, 1281 (9th Cir
1981).
186. This is not to say that the policy that expired patents enter the public domain is
necessarily any less important than the policy of protecting prior users. Rather, the author's
perception that invalidity based on the licensee's own work is the stronger argument against rigid
application of Shell's test is based on the fact that both Shell and Go Medical involved invalidity
based on the licensor's own prior work, the precise opposite situation of invalidity based on the
licensee's prior work, making this a more directly relevant consideration to the doctrine, as
compared with expired patents.
187. See supra Part I.
188. See supra Part H.
189. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (holding that while the "machine-or-
transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool," it "is not the sole test").
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apprehension-of-suit test,190 or the teaching-suggestion-motivation
test,1 9 ' Shell's one-sentence test provides useful guidance, but should
not be considered dispositive in every case.
Other factors not captured in that one sentence of Shell also may
bear on whether and when a licensee should be required to pay royalties
on an invalid patent. These factors include the structure of the license
agreement, and the nature of the invalidating prior art reference or
references.1 92 Where the license agreement is a portfolio license that
does not place notification obligations on the licensee, the federal
patent policy of encouraging prompt validity challenge would
sometimes be better served by allowing invocation of Lear to avoid
pre-challenge royalties on an invalid patent.'9 3 And where the
invalidating prior art originates from the licensee, the equities relating
to inventorship and the strong federal patent policy of protecting prior
users, should counsel against requiring the licensee to pay for the use
of its own prior work.1' Where the invalidating prior art is an expired
patent, the federal patent policy that expired patents enter the public
domain, may also counsel somewhat in favor of invocation of Lear.95
Although not a direct focus of this article, the AIA provided new
ways of challenging validity through the USPTO rather than directly in
district courts.'96 As the Jang case discussed above illustrates, tricky
situations can arise in the interplay between district court proceedings
and concurrent administrative reexaminations.197 Any. concurrent
administrative proceedings challenging the validity of the licensed
patents should be carefully considered by courts in endeavoring to
prevent inequitable behavior and promote federal patent policy by
avoiding incentives for delayed validity challenge.
190. See Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (rejecting the Federal
Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit" test for declaratory judgment case or controversy in
favor of a more flexible "all the circumstances" test).
191. See KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) ("We begin by rejecting the
rigid approach [to nonobviousness] of the [Federal Circuit] Court of Appeals.").
192. See supra Part IV.
193. See supra Part IV[A].
194. See supra Part IV[BJ[1].
195. See supra Part IV[B][2].
196. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011);
Andre lancu et. al., Challenging Validity of Issued Patents Before the PTO: Inter Partes Reexarn
Now or Inter Partes Review Later?, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 148, 148 (2012) ("One
of the major changes [with the AIA] was the creation of new procedures for challenging the
validity of an issued patent before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.").
197. See supra note 136.
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In sum, when deciding whether a licensee must pay pre-challenge
royalties on an invalid patent, the doctrine as reflected in Lear and Shell
should be applied holistically, in view of the equities and federal patent
policies reflected in those decisions. In addition to the factors captured
in Shell's one-sentence test, courts should consider at least: (1) the
structure of the license agreement, i.e., how many patents it covers, and
whether it places notification obligations on the licensee, with an eye
towards preventing any incentives for delay; and (2) the nature of the
invalidating prior art, i.e., whether it originates from the licensor or the
licensee, or whether it is an expired patent, with an eye towards the
relative equities of the case and preventing the licensee from
inequitably being required to pay for the use of its own prior work, or
for an invention which is rightfully part of the public domain.
